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dissent was on point when it stated that the court was simply "legislat-
ing an exception to the clear and specific provisions of the Code so as
to make the Code meaningless." '29 The result of the court's misin-
terpretation of the Code is that while the Florida Uniform Commercial
Code may read like the U.C.C. does in other jurisdictions, it operates
quite differently where a security interest in after-acquired property is
involved. This new Florida rule frustrates the U.C.C. and renders
certain types of loan financing obsolete in Florida. It is urgent that this
decision not be followed in the future.
DONALD FRANCIS SINEX
FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF LOCAL POLITICAL
CORRUPTION: A NEW APPROACH
Should the federal government be allowed to prosecute local
politicians for extorting money from local businessmen, especially if
there is no evidence of force, fear, or threats? Casimir Staszcuk, a
Chicago alderman, accepted three payments of $3,000 each from a
"zoning consultant" on behalf of his clients in return for Staszcuk's
agreement not to oppose their applications for zoning amendments in
the alderman's ward. The federal government charged Staszcuk with
violation of the Hobbs Act,' which contains two alternative definitions
of extortion: the obtaining of property from another, with his consent,
induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or
fear, or under color of official right. The United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, relying solely on
the "color of official right" definition of extortion, convicted Staszcuk.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held, affirmed: A
local official accepting money under color of official right, which
activity affects interstate commerce, may be convicted of violating the
Hobbs Act. United States v. Staszcuk, 502 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1974).
Before the significance of the color of official right definition of
extortion as contained in the Hobbs Act is discussed, the threshold
29. Id. at 39.
1. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1970):
(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the
movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or
attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person
or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
(b) As used in this section-
(2) The term "extortion" means the obtaining of property from another, with
his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or
fear, or under color of official right.
CASES NOTED
question of whether this federal statute may properly be used to
combat local political corruption must be answered.
2
The origins of the Hobbs Act can be traced to the original An-
tiracketeering Act of 1934. 3 That act was designed to bring the federal
government's authority to bear on professional criminal activity which
affected interstate commerce. 4 According to the chairman of the Sen-
ate committee which drafted the bill, its purpose was "to render more
difficult the activities of predatory criminal gangs of the Kelly and
Dillinger types." 5 At the time the Act was passed there was great
concern over the actions of professional gangsters and this accounts for
the preceding language. Assuredly, the Act was meant to reach profes-
sional gangsters. However, the scope of the Antiracketeering Act
was intended to reach beyond this limited group. The Judiciary
Committee's report to the Senate stated that the bill was designed to
"extend Federal jurisdiction over all restraints of any commerce within
the scope of the Federal Government's constitutional powers."
'6
The Antiracketeering Act, however, excepted from its proscrip-
tions "the payment of wages by a bona fide employer to a bona fide
employee." '7 In 1942 the United States Supreme Court held, in United
States v. Local 807,8 that when members of the New York Teamster's
Union forced their way onto trucks entering New York from New
Jersey, and by beating or threats of beating procured payment to
themselves of the equivalent of a day's union wages from the out-of-
state drivers, such action was not punishable under the Antiracketeer-
ing Act. The court based its dicision on the fact that, in some instances,
the New York teamsters assisted or offered to assist in the loading and
driving of the trucks after payment was exacted and thus fit into the
bona fide employer-employee exception. Congressional disapproval of
this decision resulted in the passage of the Hobbs Act 9 which elimi-
nated the wage exception that had been the basis for the Local 807
decision and thus assured that union activities would fall within the
purview of the new Antiracketeering Act. 1° But, in addition, Con-
gressman Hobbs described his bill in these terms:
2. "Congress has traditionally been reluctant to define as a federal crime conduct readily
denounced as criminal by the states." Courts are equally hesitant to overextend limited federal
police resources. Unless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have
significantly changed the federal-state balance. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971).
3. Act of June 8, 1934, ch. 569, 48 Stat. 979.
4. S. REP. No. 532, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
5. S. REP. No. 1440, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
6. S. REP. No. 532, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934) (emphasis added).
7. Act of June 8, 1934, ch. 569, § 2(a), 48 Stat. 979.
8. 315 U.S. 521 (1942) [hereinafter referred to as Local 807].
9. "[T]his bill is made necessary by the amazing decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
the United States against Teamster's Union 807 .... " 91 CONG. REC. 11,900 (1945) (remarks of
Congressman Hancock).
10. The Hobbs Act also eliminated the proviso in section 6 of the Antiracketeering Act that
no court should apply the Act to impair or diminish the rights of labor organizations. That
proviso helped support the Local 807 holding and was removed to prevent a resuscitation of that
decision. See 91 CONG. REc. 11,912 (1945) (remarks of Congressman Hobbs).
1975]
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This bill is grounded on the bedrock principle that crime is
crime, no matter who commits it; and that robbery is robbery
and extortion extortion, whether or not the perpetrator has a
union card. It covers whoever in any way or degree interferes
with interstate or foreign commerce by robbery or
extortion. '
Thus, both the original Antiracketeering Act and the current Hobbs
Act were motivated by immediate and specific goals: professional
gangsterism in the former; an unsatisfactory Supreme Court construc-
tion in the latter. However, these immediate objectives in no way limit
the broad scope of the Acts. This contention is supported explicitly by
their language, and impliedly by legislative history.
Support for the proposition that the Hobbs Act may properly be
brought against corrupt local politicians can be found in case law as
well as legislative history. In cases where the proper scope of the Act
was questioned, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that "undeniably the
act [sic] was particularly aimed at labor racketeering, but by its terms
it is not so limited."'1 2 The District Court for the Western District of
Missouri has agreed with the Ninth Circuit.' 3 The Eighth Circuit has
interpreted the Act even more broadly by holding that section 1951
"proscribes all forms of extortion which affect interstate commerce."' 4
In addition to these cases where proper application of the Hobbs Act
was in issue, there are no less than 12 reported decisions in which local
public officials have been convicted under section 1951.15 Thus the
Hobbs Act is properly invoked whenever a local official is guilty of
extortion and that extortion affects interstate commerce. 16
11. 89 CONG. REc. 3217 (1943).
12. Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d 718, 732 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953
(1964).
13. United States v. Howe, 353 F. Supp. 419, 424 (W.D. Mo. 1973).
14. United States v. Mitchell, 463 F.2d 187, 193 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 969
(1973) (emphasis added).
15. United States v. Crowley, 504 F.2d 992 (1974); United States v. Irali, 503 F.2d 1295
(1974); United States v. Pacente, 490 F.2d 661 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Gill, 490 F.2d 233
(7th Cir. 1973); United States v. DeMet, 486 F.2d 816 (7th Cir. 1973) cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969
(1974); United States v. Kenny, 462 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 914 (1972); United
States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 936 (1972); Hyde v. United
States, 448 F.2d 815 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1058 (1972); United States v. Pranno,
358 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 944 (1968); United States v. Sopher, 362
F.2d 523 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 928 (1966); Ladner v. United States, 168 F.2d 771 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 827 (1948); United States v. Kubacki, 237 F. Supp. 638 (E.D. Pa.
1965).
16. Although a thorough discussion of the interstate commerce aspect of the Hobbs Act is
beyond the scope of this note, it should be pointed out that for purposes of prosecution under
section 1951, any effect, even de minimis, is sufficient. Battaglia v. United States, 383 F.2d 303,
305 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 907 (1968). Also, commerce may be affected even
though the actual movement of goods has ceased. United States v. Howe, 353 F. Supp. 419, 425
(W.D. Mo. 1973). A Hobbs Act prosecution may be premised upon "attempted extortion actually
or potentially affecting interstate commerce." Hulahan v. United States, 214 F.2d 441, 445 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 856 (1954) (emphasis added).
In Staszcuk, the government unsuccessfully attempted to employ this "potentiality" doctrine
to show an interstate commerce effect of a payment offered to re-zone property which was
CASES NOTED
The federal government, in seeking to eradicate local political
corruption, has been faced with two fundamentally related obstacles
which have hampered traditional 17 prosecution under the Hobbs
Act.18 First, there exists the possibility that the defendant, attempting
to avoid Hobbs Act prosecution for extortion, will claim he was guilty
only of bribery. It has been argued,' 9 that bribery is mutually exclu-
sive of extortion so that proof of the former will preclude conviction
for the latter. This so-called "bribery defense," although not readily
accepted by all courts,20 is still a serious obstacle 2' and has not yet
been explicitly disallowed as a defense to a Hobbs Act prosecution.
22
Second, extortion as traditionally 23 defined in Hobbs Act cases, neces-
sarily requires the victim to pay out of "fear."'2 4 "Proof of the state of
ultimately used in a manner consistent with its original zoning. Greater success might have been
had by arguing that by paying out funds to Staszcuk, the victim's assets were depleted and
therefore he was unable to use the expended funds in interstate commerce. Compare, United
States v. DeMet, 486 F.2d 816 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974); United States v.
Provenzano, 334 F.2d 678, (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 947 (1964); United States v. Esperti,
406 F.2d 148 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1000 (1969).
17. "Traditional" is used to signify prosecution under the "wrongful use of actual or
threatened force, violence, or fear" definition of extortion.
18. See Stern, Prosecution of Local Political Corruption Under the Hobbs Act: The Unneces-
sary Distinction Between Bribery and Extortion, 3 SETON HALL L. REV. 1 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Stern].
19. The defense is based on an improper holding in United States v. Kubacki, 237 F. Supp.
638 (E.D. Pa. 1965). There the court incorrectly assumed that Congress had adopted, essentially,
New York's extortion statute and since under New York law bribery and extortion were mutually
exclusive, the federal construction of section 1951 must follow the New York rule. However, the
reference to New York law in Congressional debate over the Hobbs Act was merely to assuage
pro-labor opponents of the bill by showing that it was substantially similar to their own New
York law. See 91 CONG. REc. 11,900 (1945) (remarks of Congressman Hobbs). Nowhere is there
an indication that Congress intended constructions of the New York act to determine federal
constructions of the Hobbs Act. In fact, the New York rule concerning mutual exclusivity of
bribery and extortion (People v. Feld, 262 App. Div. 909, 28 N.Y.S.2d 796 (1941)) arose after the
original Hobbs Act language was promulgated in the Antiracketeering Act of 1934, and so no
Congressional intent to have that rule obtain in Hobbs Act cases could have existed. Stern, supra
note 18.
20. See United States v. Gill, 490 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. DeMet, 486
F.2d 816 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974); United States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272
(2d Cir. 1973), cert denied, 411 U.S. 982 (1973); United States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49 (3d Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 936 (1972); United States v. Pranno, 385 F.2d 387, 390 (7th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 944 (1968).
21. United States v. Kubacki, 237 F. Supp. 638 (E.D. Pa. 1965) (which explicitly recognized
the defense); United States v. Critchley, 353 F.2d 358 (3d Cir. 1965) (which implicitly recognized
the defense).
22. This is so notwithstanding the Seventh Circuit's observation in United States v. DeMet,
486 F.2d 816, 821 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974), which erroneously indicates the
Second Circuit has so decided in United States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272, 278 (2d Cir. 1973).
Actually, the Kahn court merely held that, in the absence of Pennsylvania case law, the Second
Circuit would find Pennsylvania law, not federal law, to view bribery and extortion as mutually
exclusive.
23. See note 17 supra.
24. United States v. Critchley, 353 F.2d 358, 361 (3d Cir. 1965). "Fear," however, may
include fear of economic loss as well as physical harm. Bianchi v. United States, 219 F.2d 182,
189 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 915 (1955). Additionally, the prosecutor need not show that
the defendant induced the fear, but only that he utilized it to extort money. United States v.
Gordon, 449 F.2d 100, 102 (3d Cir. 1971). Nor does he need to show the extortioner received any
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mind of the victim is relevant, indeed essential to a prosecution for
extortion .. . ."I' Thus, under facts present in Staszcuk, the defendant
might have escaped conviction by arguing that he was merely the
recipient of a bribe and that the three owners seeking to have their
properties' zoning changed were never in "fear" of losing anything;
merely hopeful of increased profit.
Staszcuk represents the first prosecution under the Hobbs Act to
rely solely on the "color of official right" definition of extortion,
26
which is equivalent to the common law definition of the crime. 27 Use
of this definition circumvents the above described obstacles. There is
no requirement under the "color of official right" definition that the
taking involve fear.
28
The evidence need only demonstrate that the public official
has obtained from the "victim" something of value to which
the official is not entitled, in return for something that should
have been provided without payment.29
Thus, the prosecutor need not prove the subjective state of mind of the
"victim" as a necessary element of a Hobbs Act violation. Also, since
fear is not an element of the crime under the "color of official right"
definition, the bribery defense which distinguishes bribery and extor-
tion based on the presence or absence of fear in the payor is wholly
inapplicable.
However, the statement of the elements necessary for a conviction
under the "color" definition as set out by Judge Campbell in his
concurring opinion quoted above, raises the possibility of a new brib-
ery defense not involving the motivation of the "victim." If his state-
ment of the elements is correct, 30 a public official, who accepts money
to assist the payor in obtaining a benefit to which the payor is not
lawfully entitled would be guilty of bribery and not extortion. How-
ever, this distinction between the two crimes doesn't necessarily mean
that they are mutually exclusive offenses. A single payment may be
made to secure more than one objective, so that where the payor is
legally entitled to one objective and not another, the defendant-official
may be guilty of bribery and extortion for the receipt of the single sum.
personal benefit from the extortion. United States v. Provenzano, 334 F.2d 678, 686 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 947 (1964).
25. United States v. Kennedy, 291 F.2d 457, 458 (2d Cir. 1961).
26. One prior case exists, however, in which the defendants were charged with extortion
through wrongful use of fear or alternatively, under color of official right. United States v.
Kenny, 462 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 914 (1972). Also, two subsequent cases
have employed the same alternative theories: United States v. Crowley, 504 F.2d 992 (1974);
United States v. Irali, 503 F.2d 1295 (1974).
27. The "wrongful use of force, violence, or fear" language was added to the common law
definition by early statutes in order to expand the scope of the crime to encompass action by
private individuals. See 35 C.J.S. Extortion § 1 (1960).
28. See 31 AM. JUR. Extortion § 4 (1967).
29. 502 F.2d at 882-83.
30. There is some authority opposed to Judge Campbell's view. Commonwealth v. Wilson,
30 Pa. Super. 26 (1906). See State v. Sweeney, 180 Minn. 450, 454, 231 N.W. 225, 228 (1930).
CASES NOTED
It should be noted that Judge Campbell's construction of the
"under color of official right" language to include only those acts done
by an official which he was legally permitted to do, is not the only
possible construction I.3  It effectively excludes from the Hobbs Act's
reach cases where officials receive money for performing extra-legal
acts. For example, a police officer who received money in exchange for
not molesting a narcotics operation would not fall within Judge
Campbell's definition, since the narcotics dealers were not legally
entitled to the "service" performed by the officer. However an over-
broad interpretation of the "color of official right" language might lead
to an excess burden on federal investigative and prosecutorial
resources. 32 What then should be the proper limits of federal prosecu-
tion for extortion "under color of official right"?
The courts may properly enjoy some latitude in their view of the
meaning of the Act's language. 33 This is particularly true since the
legislative history of the Hobbs Act and its predecessors offer no
indication that Congress intended any particular construction or use of
the "color of official right" language. Rather it seems that Congress
adopted the common law offense of extortion and added to it the
"wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear" language
which had been adopted by the legislatures of several states.3 4 How-
ever, notwithstanding any latitude the courts may have, reference to
the wealth of state cases 35 which construe similar language based also
on common law extortion would be desirable in determining exactly
what actions are extortionate. Similarly, determinations of who are
officers within the "official right" language should be made upon
reflection to the various state cases.3 6 In this regard it will be interest-
ing to note if prosecutors seek to apply the Hobbs Act to de facto
officials and power brokers who hold no office, but nonetheless exert
substantial control over officials and the execution of their duties.
HERBERT M. SUSKIN
31. State v. Sweeney, 180 Minn. 450, 454, 231 N.W. 225, 228 (1930).
32. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971).
33. For a discussion of why this might be so, see Stern, supra note 18, at 14.
34. See 31 AM. JUR. Extortion (1967); 35 C.J.S. Extortion (1960).
35. See 31 AM. JUR. Extortion §§ 4,5 (1967); 35 C.J.S. Extortion § 5 (1960); Annot., 116
AM. ST. REP. 446 (1906).
36. See 31 AM. JUR. Extortion § 3 (1967); 35 C.J.S. Extortion § 9 (1960); Annot., 116 AM.
ST. REP. 446 (1906).
